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W. Bradley Wendel1 
 
Today “trolldom”—the seeking of financial advantage by buying or otherwise 
obtaining a legal claim (as distinct from filing a legal claim in order to seek 
redress for injury)—thrives. 
 





 The financing of the expenses of litigation by third parties – excluding the parties’ 
counsel, via a contingency-fee agreement; and defense provided by liability insurers – 
has been described with a variety of unflattering metaphors. Litigation financers have 
been likened to gamblers in the courtroom casino,2 loan sharks,3 vultures,4 Wild West 
outlaws,5 and busybodies mucking about in the private affairs of others.6 The practice of 
litigation financing is the new thing – after advertising, contingent fees, and 
multidisciplinary practices – that threatens to “degrade legal professionalism.”7 Now 
                                                          
1 Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The author serves as an outside legal advisor on legal ethics and 
professional responsibility issues to Bentham/IMF and Longford Capital.  
2  Gard [a Norwegian maritime risk insurer], Insight: High Rollers in the Courtroom Casino – Champerty 
and the Rise of Litigation Finance (May 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.gard.no/ikbViewer/web/updates/content/20740525/high-rollers-in-the-courtroom-casino-
champerty-and-the-rise-of-litigation-finance; U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING 
LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2009).  
3 Douglas R. Richmond, Litigation Funding: Investing, Lending, or Loan Sharking?, 2005 PROF. LAW. 17 
(2005); Daniel Brook, Litigation by Loan Shark, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Sept.-Oct. 2004), at 42. Predictably, 
someone stretched the metaphor by announcing that a “sharknado” had descended upon the state capital. 
See Travis Akin, Beware of “Lawsuit Loan Sharks”, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (March 8, 2015), 
available at http://www.bnd.com/incoming/article17739563.html. Is it too soon to declare that this 
comparison has jumped the shark?  
4 Mark Kantor, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: An Essay About New Developments, 
24 ICSID REV. 65, 66, (2009). 
5 See Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be 
Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55 (2004). 
6 Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE (Jun. 13, 2011), at 68 (“Dress it up as 
you like, there's something about all this secret meddling in other people's bitterest disputes and profiting 
from them that doesn't sit well.”). 
7 Robert Weber, IBM GC Says: Beware Of Lenders Offering To Finance Your Lawsuit, FORBES (Feb. 12, 
2013) (“I fear the end result of allowing third-party financing to flourish is a slow but steady shift away 
from the traditional understanding of law as a profession toward a conception of law as just another 
money-making venture”). The worry that the pursuit of profit will degrade the legal profession into a 
“mere” business is a perennial one. See, e.g., Petition of Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 193 (N.J. 
1986) (“attorney advertising raises the understandable and realistic concern that the legal profession will 
degenerate into just another trade’). ’Justice O’Connor defended restrictions on lawyer advertising as a 
means of bolstering lawyer professionalism. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 488 
(1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“membership [in a profession] entails an ethical obligation to temper 
one’s selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of conduct that could not be enforced 
either through legal fiat or through the discipline of the market.”). See also MICHAEL H. TROTTER, PROFIT 
AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION? (1997); Russell G. Pearce, The 
Professionalism Paradigm Shift:  Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and 
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comes Judge Richard Posner to lend his prominence and rhetorical razzle-dazzle to a 
new image, litigation trolls. The impact of the comparison is undeniable. Everybody 
hates patent trolls.8 They leech off a cooperative scheme designed to enhance social 
welfare, appropriating unjustified private rents. This rent-seeking behavior siphons off 
resources that could be put to productive use and produces no offsetting benefit, and 
thus constitutes a social deadweight loss.9 Moreover, patent trolls do not innovate, and 
fostering innovation is the raison d’être of the patent system.10 They therefore defile 
what should be a pure system of encouraging invention, sullying it with their purely 
profit-motivated behavior. 
 
 When Judge Posner refers to purchasing all or part of a legal claim as trolling, 
one would therefore expect some kind of analysis showing what is wrong with a 
particular transaction. Legal claims are, after all, for the most part freely alienable. With 
the exception of the prohibition in most states on the assignment of highly “personal” 
claims such as those for bodily injury, defamation, fraud, and legal malpractice, choses 
in action are freely assignable.11 (For example, defendants frequently assign insurance 
bad-faith claims to the plaintiff’s lawyer as part of the settlement of a personal-injury 
lawsuit.) Not only are most claims assignable, but the proceeds of most non-assignable 
claims, such as those for personal injury, are assignable.12 They may be pledged as 
security for a loan, for example, under Article 9 of the U.C.C.13 A stream of payments 
under a structured settlement, even of a non-assignable personal-injury claim, can be 
assigned and even securitized.14 Following the principle of the assignability of the 
proceeds of a cause of action, a New York State court recently held that a law firm 
cannot avoid an obligation to make repayments under a revolving credit facility where 
the lender has a security interest in the firm’s accounts receivable, notwithstanding the 
prohibition on a lawyer sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer.15 Not only are legal claims 
assignable, but as long as the total amount of a fee is reasonable,16 lawyers are permitted 
to profit from litigation. Contingency fees give lawyers a personal interest, shared with 
their clients, in the subject matter of the litigation.17 Indeed, the albeit imperfect 
                                                          
Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1996) (“in contrast to businesspersons, who maximize 
financial self-interest, lawyers altruistically place the good of their clients and the good of society above 
their own self-interest”); Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. REV. 741 
(1988); Tom C. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 251 (1975) (“the primacy of 
service over profit is the criterion which distinguishes a profession from a business”).  
8 See Brian L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735 (2015) (“Everybody hates intellectual property 
trolls. They are parasites, who abuse intellectual property by forcing innovators to pay an unjust toll.”).  
9 See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 
2124-25 (2013) (reporting, but not necessarily endorsing this critique).  
10 Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1587-89 (2009). 
11 See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 74-82 (2011).  
12 Id. at 82-85. 
13 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Art. 9 § 9-102(a)(13)(B)(ii) (2000). 
14 See Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoring, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859, 944-45. 
15 Hamilton Capital VII, LLC v. Khorrami, LLP, 48 Misc.3d 1223(A), 2015 WL 4920281 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 
Aug. 17, 2015). The fee-splitting rule is NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 5.4(a).  
16 Reasonableness is a defined term in the law of lawyering. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, 
Rule 1.5(a), and numerous cases applying the rule.  
17 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 509 (1996); Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987). 
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alignment of interests created by contingency fees is a significant part of their 
justification. 
 
 Judge Posner was not really concerned with giving an explanation of the concept 
of litigation trolls. The case in question had bizarre facts, and went off on the principle 
that a purchaser of a claim was not a judgment creditor in good faith where the 
purchaser was, in effect, on both sides of a transaction and in a position to manipulate 
the price of the asset.18 One therefore wonders about the point of the gratuitous swipe at 
the buying and selling of legal claims. If Judge Posner disapproves of third-party 
litigation financing, is it too much to ask why? What makes buying a legal claim trolling 
and not simply acquiring a property interest that has long been recognized by law?19 
 
 Broadly speaking, a critique of a practice like patent trolling or third-party 
litigation financing can be instrumental or conceptual. An instrumental argument 
against patent trolls might be that, by aggregating a large number of patents and 
overwhelming an alleged infringer with lawsuits, trolls are able to force technology 
companies to pay royalties rather than challenging potentially invalid patents or 
denying infringement.20 Sometimes one also encounters a different type of instrumental 
critique that patent trolls are doing something sneaky or underhanded, or exploiting or 
abusing the patent system.21 For example, the Supreme Court once said that Nineteenth 
Century patent trolling “embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and 
apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious 
accountings for profits made in good faith.”22 That is a different type of instrumental 
critique – one that focuses on the violations of duties owed as a matter of the governing 
law of patents and the likelihood that the parties will be tempted to violate them by the 
prospect of economic rewards.  
 
 Conceptual critiques are more elusive.23 This type of analysis does not have a 
particularly good reputation in the contemporary legal academy. The devastating attack 
on the reliance by judges on “transcendental nonsense” and a noumenal “heaven of legal 
concepts” still inspires caution in anyone tempted to put forth a claim that property, a 
contract, or a corporation is “really such-and-such,” in its essential form.24 
Nevertheless, the argument that third party financiers are litigation trolls is, at its root, 
an appeal to the essential features of the concept of a civil lawsuit. It may seem a bit 
quixotic to attribute a metaphysical thesis to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute 
for Legal Reform, when the Chamber is primarily fighting a public relations battle, but 
as a scholar I cannot help but be puzzled by the claim that it is a necessary truth that 
                                                          
18 See Carthart v. Carhart-Halaska Int’l, LLC, 788 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2015). 
19 See, e.g. Kelly, Grossman & Flanagan, LLP v. Quick Cash, Inc., 950 N.Y.S.2d 723 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) 
(litigation funder acquires “ownership interest in proceeds for a claim” under New York law). 
20 See Lemley & Melamed, supra note __, at 2153. As they do throughout their paper, Lemley and 
Melamed push back on this frequently voiced criticism of patent trolls. It is offered here only as an 
example of an instrumental argument that might be made. 
21 See, e.g., Merges, supra note __, at 1591. 
22 Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883) (quoted in Merges, supra note __, at 1595). 
23 See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Raz, Authority, and Conceptual Analysis, 50 AM. J. JURIS. 311 (2005). 
24 For the classic takedown of formalist legal reasoning, see Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and 
the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). 
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third parties cannot invest in lawsuits. The Chamber and other critics of third-party 
litigation financing want to argue that, in addition to the allegedly harmful impacts on 
the rate of non-meritorious litigation and the cost of defending lawsuits, allowing 
strangers to purchase legal claims is somehow a violation of the natural order of 
things.25 If it were merely happenstance – a convention of Anglo-American procedure – 
that third-party investment in legal claims was unusual, and historically suspect, then it 
would be open to observe that many practices we now take for granted were once not 
only innovative but a bit radical. Life insurance, attorney contingent fees, and derivative 
contracts on exchange-traded commodities were all formerly regarded with extreme 
suspicion. Futures contracts, for example, were seen as no different from gambling, and 
life insurance was regarded as even worse – gambling on the possibility of death.26 
Contingent fees, similarly, were “thought to stir up unwanted litigation and involve 
unscrupulous lawyers in the nefarious business of brokering lawsuits.”27 To forestall the 
argument that third-party litigation financing is simply another innovative form of 
investing, hedging risk, or accomplishing some other financial end, critics have to rely 
on the strong thesis that categories such as “gambling,” “insurance,” and “investment” 
are not conventional but somehow the meaning of these concept terms is fixed by the 
natural world. Otherwise litigation investment is likely to take its place alongside 
derivatives and contingent fees as another once-controversial but subsequently 
generally accepted financial product. 
 
 The argument in this paper will proceed by comparing, in Section II, the 
conceptual critique of litigation financing with two other areas in which it is claimed 
that some form of financing “just doesn’t sit right” in light of the nature and function of 
the legal system. The first is patent trolling. The second is private financing of 
campaigns for public office. Both comparison cases involve the same basic issue, i.e. 
whether commercial practice of investing is somehow anathema to the practice 
considered in terms of its end or function. Not to give away too many surprises, but 
most readers already know that the American legal system has permitted a significant 
amount of investment in patent claims and an almost untrammeled freedom for 
interested parties to donate to campaigns for political office.28 The one limit on political 
campaign financing, recently recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court,29 is the exception 
that proves the rule in an interesting way. In states that elect judges in contested, 
partisan elections, candidates for judicial office cannot personally solicit donations, 
                                                          
25 See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of Litigation 
Participation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 673 (2012). 
26 See MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 144-48 (2012) 
(describing slow path to acceptance for life insurance, as against the view that it manifested a ghoulish 
speculation in death); Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering 
in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701 (1999) (recounting history of hostility toward 
contracts that were intended to be settled by means other than the delivery of goods); Robert Merkin, 
Gambling By Insurance – A Study of the Life Insurance Act of 1774, 9 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 331 (1980).   
27 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.4.1, at 52 (1986) (citing Coon v. Landry, 408 So. 2d 
262 (La. 1981)). See also Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning 
of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1998). 
28 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). On the subject of conceptual 
analysis, the first conceptual wrong turn in the regulation of campaign financing was arguably the Court’s 
equation of free speech with donating to an election campaign in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
29 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1656 (2015). 
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although donors are permitted to give money to the judge’s political campaign 
committee. Somehow privately funded political campaigns are “trolls” when the elected 
officials are judges, but instances of the exercise of First Amendment freedoms when all 
other elected officials are concerned. As Chief Justice Roberts explained, in an 
astonishingly question-begging passage, “Judges are not politicians, even when they 
come to the bench by way of the ballot. And a State’s decision to elect its judiciary does 
not compel it to treat judicial candidates like campaigners for political office.”30 The 
question is, therefore, what the analogies to patent trolls and campaign contributions 
(judicial and non-judicial) tell us about the third-party financing of lawsuits. Section III 
takes up this question and concludes that there is no conceptual reason to regard third-
party financing as somehow incompatible with the existing institutions and practices of 
the civil justice system.  
 
II. Arenas of Trolling: Campaign Financing and Assignments of Patents. 
 
 A. When are Candidates in Contested Elections not “Politicians”?   
 
 The battle of analogies will begin with contributions to the campaigns of 
candidate for judicial office. The analogy goes like this: The foundational normative 
ideal of the role of judge is impartiality. A judge must decide cases based on “proper 
controlling factors” and not “some personal bias or improper consideration.”31 This 
ideal is familiar from the ritual of Senate confirmation hearings, at which appointees 
declare that they will be like umpires calling balls and strikes, and Senators from the 
opposing party work themselves into a lather over evidence that the appointee will not 
be impartial.32 Into this pure practice of impartial adjudication intrudes the grubby 
reality that most state judges are selected in public elections.33 Some judicial elections 
are partisan, meaning that candidates can identify themselves as part of the Republican, 
Democratic, or a third party ticket.34 The Supreme Court has held that the First 
                                                          
30 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1662.  
31 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009). 
32 As an illustration of the latter, consider the statement of Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions, the ranking 
Republican member of the Judiciary Committee, in response to President Obama’s nomination of Sonia 
Sotomayor to the U.S. Supreme Court and his expressed hope that that she would bring her life 
experience and empathy to the Supreme Court: 
 
“I will not vote for, and no senator should vote for, anyone who will not render justice 
impartially,” Sessions said. “Call it empathy, call it prejudice or call it sympathy, but whatever it 
is, it’s not law,” he said. “In truth, it's more akin to politics, and politics has no place in the 
courtroom.” 
 
Robert Barnes, Amy Goldstein & Paul Kane, In Senate Confirmation Hearings, Sotomayor Pledges 
“Fidelity to Law,” WASH. POST (July 14, 2009). 
33 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1662 (noting that, in 39 states, trial or appellate judges are elected, and 
that in Florida, appellate judges are first appointed and then stand for retention elections every six years, 
while trial judges are popularly elected). 
34 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Benchmarks: Judges On Trial, Judicial Selection and Election, 58 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 451 (2009). Even in states in which judicial elections are nominally nonpartisan, a great deal of 
partisan politics enters into the campaign. See Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: 
Nonpartisan Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397 (2003). 
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Amendment permits candidates to state their opinion on contested political issues.35 A 
candidate for judicial office may, for example, announce that she will be “tough on 
crime” or express her dismay with excessive litigation and its costs to businesses in the 
state. The result should surprise no one. Judicial elections have become expensive, 
dominated by organized interest groups, and often fought around highly salient political 
issues like the death penalty or same-sex marriage. In 2010 in Iowa, for example, nearly 
a million dollars in out-of-state money was spent on a campaign against retention of 
three justices on the Iowa Supreme Court who had voted along with a unanimous court 
to strike down the state Defense of Marriage Act.36 The American Bar Association’s Code 
of Judicial Conduct tries to explain how it is that judges can be elected and yet respect 
the value of impartiality in adjudication: “Rather than making decisions based upon the 
expressed views or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes decisions based upon 
the law and the facts of every case.”37 If that were the case, however, what would be the 
point of raising money to target judges who vote the “wrong” way? Focus group studies 
show that many voters do not acknowledge a difference between the role of judges and 
non-judicial elected officials.38 In a democracy, these voters may have a point, as the 
long debate over the countermajoritarian difficulty in constitutional law shows.39 Judges 
make policy, and policy-makers should be accountable to the voters.40  
 
 Yet the value of democratic accountability must contend with the government’s 
interest in “preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”41 Not only is 
there a vital state interest in the fairness and integrity of the judicial system, but there is 
an equally compelling interest in safeguarding the public’s confidence in the system.42 
                                                          
35 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (invalidating a provision of the Minnesota 
Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited a candidate for judicial office from “announc[ing] his or her 
views on disputed legal or political issues”). 
36 See Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate Accountability or Rampant 
Passion?, 46 COURT REV. 118 (2010). A well known precedent for the Iowa election was the defeat of 
California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other Justices in retention elections, motivated 
by their opposition to capital punishment. See Friedman, supra note __, at 456. It is ironic, given the 
opposition to third-party litigation financing by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its Institution for 
Legal Reform, that the Chamber and allied tort-reform groups contributed heavily to a campaign in 
Illinois designed to seat a justice on the state supreme court who would be friendly to the Chamber’s anti-
regulation and anti-litigation agenda. See Burt Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The 
Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1229, 1229-31 (2008). The Chamber’s concern for keeping the justice system unsullied by money 
is apparently a case of sauce for the goose, but not for the gander.  
37 ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Rule 4.1, cmt. [1] (2010). 
38 Schotland, supra note __, at 123. Courts sometimes agree. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, 
considering disciplinary charges brought against a judicial candidate, said that “the distinction between 
judicial elections and other types of elections has been greatly exaggerated.” Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 
1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002). 
39 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).  
40 Friedman, supra note __, at 452. Following out the principle of democratic accountability to its logical 
implication, interest groups in several states have distributed questionnaires to judicial candidates asking 
about their views on issues such as abortion, assisted suicide, human cloning, and same-sex marriage; 
theories of judging such as “strict constructionism” vs. “the living document approach”; and even “which 
former president best represents your political philosophy – Kennedy, Carter, Reagan, or Bush.” Id. at 
464-65. 
41 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666. 
42 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009). 
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This interest underlies the regulatory approach of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, 
which instructs judges not only to avoid impropriety but also the appearance of 
impropriety. The Florida judicial conduct rule at issue in Williams-Yulee prohibits 
judges from personally soliciting campaign funds.43 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for 
the Court majority, cited his most illustrious predecessor as Chief Justice for the 
proposition that a judge must “observe the utmost fairness” and strive to be “perfectly 
and completely independent, with nothing to influence or control him but God and his 
conscience.”44 He admitted that the majority of elected judges strive to be, and in fact 
mostly succeed in being fair and impartial. Empirical evidence is unclear on the effect of 
campaign donations on judicial decisions; even if judges decide in ways that favor their 
donors’ interests, this may not establish a causal connection, because donors may 
support judges with whom they feel ideologically compatible, and the judge’s ideology 
may determine the decision.45 Nevertheless, Florida has a compelling state interest in 
avoiding the “regrettable but unavoidable appearance that judges who personally ask for 
money may diminish their integrity.”46 This is the case even though judges may in fact 
obtain money from private donors, serve as treasurer of their political campaign 
committees, learn the identity of donors, and even write thank-you notes to donors.47 
Perhaps this does not rise to the level of underinclusiveness that undermine the state’s 
assertion of a compelling interest,48 but it does seem like a strange approach to 
regulation. Florida is not seeking to ban campaign contributions in light of concerns 
about actual biased adjudication, but it will prohibit judges from asking for 
contributions, because the public might think judges are biased. Particularly in light of 
the noise and intensity of modern issue-driven judicial election campaigns, Florida’s 
approach seems a bit like trying to prevent forest fires by prohibiting television coverage 
of forest fires.  
 
 Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion better highlights the deep conceptual 
tension in the field of judicial elections and campaign finance. If they are different from 
other elected officials, it is because judges are not expected to be directly attentive to the 
concerns of their constituents.49 Whatever one thinks of campaign finance decisions like 
Citizens United and Buckley, they do reflect a strong conception of democratic 
accountability. Voters and donors support candidates who are expected to be responsive 
to their beliefs and interests.50 As Justice Ginsburg puts it, however, “when the political 
campaign-finance apparatus is applied to judicial elections, the distinction of judges 
from politicians dims.”51 If that distinction is blurred, the effect may be to reopen the 
normative issue that Chief Justice Roberts tried so hard to dodge – i.e. whether judges 
ought to behave more like politicians, in the sense of being responsive to the will of 
voters. Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion makes exactly this point. “A Court that sees 
                                                          
43 Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7C(1) (cited in Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1663). 
44 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667 (citing Address of John Marshall, in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF 
THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829–1830, p. 616 (1830)). 
45 Friedman, supra note __, at 469-71. 
46 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667. 
47 Id. at 1663. 
48 Id. at 1669-70. 
49 Id. at 1674 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
50 See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. ___ (2014). 
51 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1674 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  
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impropriety in a candidate’s request for any contribution to his election campaign does 
not much like judicial section by the people.”52 Justices Ginsburg and Scalia both 
recognize that there are certain features that make judges a particular type of public 
official, distinct from others. If interested individuals and groups can donate to judicial 
election campaigns in the hopes of electing judges who agree with their positions on 
contested policy issues, then judges are no different from legislators. The only difference 
is that Justice Ginsburg would prefer not to see this distinction eroded, while Justice 
Scalia rather gleefully imagines a judiciary shaken out of its self-image of “oracular 
sanctity,”53 and brought down from its perch of “great remove from the (ugh!) People.”54  
 
 The important thing about Williams-Yulee for the issue of third-party litigation 
financing is the pattern of analysis used by all the Justices. Although on its face a First 
Amendment case, Williams-Yulee is also about the nature of the judicial role and its 
essential features that distinguish it from other roles. Motivating the Florida rules of 
conduct for judicial candidates is a concern that, as Justice Ginsburg puts it, allowing 
too much of the apparatus of political campaign financing to intrude into the field of 
judicial elections might have the effect of turning judges into politicians in a bad sense. 
(Justice Scalia seems to want them to be politicians in a good sense.) The danger here is 
not instrumental or pragmatic, but conceptual. It is that there will no longer be a 
distinction between judges and politicians, just as one might say tablet computers have 
blurred the distinction between laptops and smartphones. The question to be taken up 
in Section II.C is whether this conceptual boundary-blurring is a bad thing and, if so, 
what can be done about it. 
 
 B. When are Non-Practicing Entities Trolls? 
 
 The “troll” label originated to describe individuals or entities other than inventors 
who assert patent claims. The threat of an infringement action can be used leverage in 
the negotiation over patent licensing, between the patent owner and the firm 
manufacturing a product incorporating the patented technology. Patents are, of course, 
a form of property, and one of the hallmarks of property is that it is freely alienable. A 
market therefore exists in patent rights, which can be sold, acquired, and licensed. Some 
patent owners engage in manufacturing products based on an invention (i.e. 
“practicing” a patent); others only in licensing. Universities, for example, may develop 
technology that they do not intend to commercialize directly, although they would be 
willing to license it to others who will manufacture and sell products based on the 
technology.55 Other firms formerly practiced the patents they owned, but due to 
technological changes have been transformed into non-practicing entities, licensing the 
technology to other manufacturers. Eastman Kodak and Texas Instruments are perhaps 
the best known firms that have found themselves in this situation. Some non-practicing 
entities – patent aggregators – go around acquiring portfolios of patents, seeking to 
license them to other firms who will manufacture products using the patented 
                                                          
52 Id., 135 S. Ct. at 1681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
53 Id. at 1681. 
54 Id. at 1682. 




invention. As in many markets, there may be middlemen or brokers, who in this case 
match manufacturing firms with patent owners so that the technology can be licensed. 
Middlemen, of which patent aggregators are arguably an example, reduce information 
costs and contribute to the efficiency of the market for patent rights. Given this 
admittedly simplified description of the market, what justifies the conclusion that a non-
practicing patent owner is engaged in troll-like behavior?  
 
 Robert Merges argues that trolling is the assertion of a patent right where the 
resulting exchange creates no social welfare gain.56 The resolution of an infringement 
action, or a bargain in the shadow of the law of patent infringement, may seem like a 
Pareto-optimal exchange. Acquiring patents is costly, and so the patent owner requires a 
royalty greater than the acquisition cost; on the other side of the transaction, the 
licensee presumably would not have agreed to pay royalties if it did not believe it 
possible to make money by selling products incorporating the patented technology. In 
this transaction, the patent owner gets paid, the licensee practices the technology, and 
everyone is better off – right? Wrong, says Merges. Patent trolls are like blackmailers, 
who offer to keep information secret in exchange for payment. The target of the 
blackmail attempt can be said to be better off making the payment – presumably secrecy 
is worth more to the target than the amount paid – yet blackmail is a crime. Blackmail is 
a significant puzzle in the theory of criminal law,57 but Merges largely brushes the 
puzzling aspects of blackmail aside by asserting that some transactions are wrong 
because they are socially wasteful. The obvious rejoinder is that if a transaction is 
Pareto-efficient, it is by definition not wasteful. To which Merges responds by quoting 
Ronald Coase’s analysis of blackmail: 
 
The blackmailer's actions generate fear and anxiety – blackmailing involves more 
than the employment of resources which leave the value of production unchanged 
– it causes real harm which reduces the value of production . . .  The victim, once 
he succumbs to the blackmailer, remains in his grip for an indefinite period. It is 
moral murder . . . [I]t is only certain threats in certain situations which cause 
harm on balance and in which the harm is sufficiently great as to make it 
desirable that those making them should be prosecuted and punished.58 
 
The “moral murder” label shows that there is a lot more going on with blackmail than 
merely a social deadweight loss. Blackmail is the wrong kind of transaction.59 It departs 
from the paradigm of a purely voluntary exchange by interfering with the target’s 
deliberation for impermissible reasons.60  
 
                                                          
56 Merges, supra note __, at 1601. 
57 See, e.g., James R. Shaw, The Morality of Blackmail, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165 (2012); Mitchell Berman, 
The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1998); Leo Katz, 
Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1993); Michael Gorr, Liberalism 
and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 43 (1992). 
58 Merges, supra note __, at 1600-01 (quoting Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorckle Lecture: Blackmail, 
74 VA. L. REV. 655, 675-676 (1988)). 
59 Id. at 1601 (“Blackmail is part of a broader pattern in which the legal system sorts out which voluntary 
transactions ought to be enforced.”). 
60 Berman, supra note __, at 831-32. 
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 Trolling, then, would be an assertion of an infringement claim for the wrong 
reasons. Legitimate inventors and middlemen contribute to the overall goal of the 
patent system, which is innovation; patent trolls, by contrast, are engaging in rent-
seeking, obtaining a private benefit without any corresponding public benefit related to 
innovation. The dividing line between trolls and non-trolls, whether universities, patent 
aggregators, or other non-practicing entities, is highly contextual and requires judgment 
to locate: “Trolling . . . is a matter of behavior rather than status. One can act as a troll, 
but it will usually not be true that one simply is a troll. The ‘troll line,’ in other words, 
must be policed case-by-case and fact-by-fact.”61 It has proven difficult to give general 
theoretical criteria for the location of the “troll line.” Mark Lemley and A. Douglas 
Melamed have made an admirable attempt, describing in detail numerous business 
models that might be regarded as trolling, but in most cases noting where there may be 
a legitimate, innovation-related justification for the activity.62 For example, royalty 
payments to non-practicing entities are economically indistinguishable from cross-
licensing arrangements entered into by competing practicing entities; the only 
difference is that monetizing a firm’s intellectual property port2folio may actually 
increase its value.63 Critics of patent trolls have an intuitive sense that trolling involves 
rent-seeking and does not contribute to innovation, but in practice this distinction can 
be hard to apply. However, the general approach of contrasting private and public 
purposes may be a promising way to get at the “wrong sorts of reasons” critique of trolls. 
 
 C. Blurred Lines. 
 
 If one believes that a feature of an institution or role, such as allowing personal 
solicitation by judges of campaign contributions by judicial candidates or the assertion 
of patent claims by non-inventors or non-practicing entities, creates a danger of 
fundamentally transforming the institution or role, there are at least four possible 
positions one can take: 
 
1. Accept that the danger exists – e.g., that too much of the apparatus of campaign 
financing can turn judges into politicians – but believe that sensible, tailored 
regulations can mitigate the risk. This is, in effect, the position of the Florida 
Code of Judicial Conduct and the approving opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in 
Williams-Yulee. In the context of patent trolling, pending House and Senate bills 
attempt to reduce the costs of undesirable patent lawsuits (however they are 
defined) using familiar litigation-reform mechanisms such as heightened 
pleading standards, fee-shifting, and limitations on discovery.64 
 
2. Deny that the danger exists, because either the role is robust enough to resist 
erosion by the addition of some new feature, or the new feature is marginal to the 
essential functions of the role. For example, at one point in his dissent in 
                                                          
61 Merges, supra note __, at 1611. 
62 Lemley & Melamed, supra note __.  
63 Id. at 2134-37. 
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Williams-Yulee, Justice Scalia notes that, for most of our history, judicial 
elections have coexisted with personal solicitations by judges of campaign 
contributions.65 This is meant to show that judges are not corrupted into 
politicians merely by asking for contributions. Some prominent patent scholars, 
including Mark Lemley, have argued that the dangers associated with patent 
trolling are greatly exaggerated, except in limited circumstances. 
 
3. Deny that the predicted outcome is actually a danger. As Justice Scalia seems to 
be saying in Williams-Yulee, if judges do become politicians, it would be a cause 
for celebration. Similarly, some observers of the patent scene of asserted that 
non-practicing entities perform a valuable function as middlemen or 
clearinghouses that reduce the transaction costs of licensing and marketing 
patented technology.66 In Lee Drucker’s contribution to this symposium, he 
asserts that a lawsuit simply is a financial asset. The boundaries between the two 
have blurred, but the result should not be consternation but acceptance. 
 
4. Believe the danger is so great that it cannot be avoided by reasonable regulation, 
and thus the practice ought to be banned altogether. This is the strongest critique 
of patent trolls, illustrated by Robert Merges’s contention that trolling is akin to 
blackmail. In the context of judicial campaigns, one might argue that judicial 
elections ought to be abolished altogether and replaced with a pure appointment 
system.  
 
In the context of litigation financing, the Chamber’s argument is a version of #4. It does 
not concede that any danger associated with third-party financing, such as increasing 
rates of meritless litigation or interfering with the attorney-client relationship, can be 
addressed by reasonable regulation. Nor does it consider the possibility that the 
institutions and procedures of the civil justice system may be sufficiently robust to 
withstand whatever pressures are created by third-party financing. Rather, its argument 
is that, by introducing commercial motivations into what should be a purely justice-
motivated domain, third-party financing distorts or defiles the institution in a way that 
cannot be counteracted by regulation. That is the sense in which it is a conceptual 
argument, and an appeal to the idea of trolling. As Section III will contend, however, the 
Chamber relies upon an ideal of litigation as a pure domain of justice that is 
unrecognizable as a description of actually existing practices. 
 
III. Who Wins the Battle of Analogies?  
 
 The conceptual arguments against judicial campaign finance and assertions of 
patent claims by non-practicing entities may be seen as variations on familiar anti-
commodification arguments.67 Commodification is the introduction of market modes of 
                                                          
65 Id. at 1678. 
66 See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note __. 
67 See W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-Commodification Norms, 62 DEPAUL 
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valuation into practices that, by their nature, ought to be valued in different ways.68 For 
example, one might criticize prostitution as valuing sexual relations under a description 
(something that can be exchanged for money) that mis-describes the way in which 
people ought to value sex – i.e. as a way of sharing joy and expressing intimacy – as part 
of a wider view about what is involved in human flourishing. The “ought” here is 
contestable, but should not scare us off. Normative arguments frequently presuppose an 
end that makes a practice intelligible, and values are simply those reasons that explain 
an action in terms of the ends of a practice. Some practices, like banking and finance, 
have purely commercial ends. Other practices, such as work for many people, have a 
plurality of ends; we may work because the job is intrinsically satisfying, but also in 
order to earn money to purchase other things. Unlike having sex in exchange for money, 
valuing one’s job as a means of earning a living is not necessarily a distortion of the 
value of work. With respect to some occupations, however, it may be a mis-description 
of the value of that calling to pursue it exclusively or even primarily for money. The 
traditional professions of medicine, law, and the clergy, and newer professions such as 
engineering, architecture, and business, are often thought to involve sources of intrinsic 
meaning that to some extent displace commercial motives for practitioners.69 That ideal 
strikes many modern lawyers as anachronistic and sentimental; they are squeezed 
financially from both sides, by burdensome student loan payments and a fiercely 
competitive market for legal services, and do not have the luxury of caring about their 
work only for its intrinsic rewards. Still, the ideal is not mysterious, even if it is elusive. 
Professional occupations can offer meaning and satisfaction along with a decent 
paycheck, in a way that is difficult to imagine in connection with jobs like working on an 
assembly line or in the checkout line at Wal-Mart.  
 
 Conclusions about how one ought to value something are reached by reflection on 
the nature and purpose of that thing. This sounds a bit woolly, but in fact it is perfectly 
ordinary. For example, critics of patent trolls begin with an express or tacit premise that 
the patent system has as its end the encouragement of innovation. Buying up a bunch of 
patent claims and holding out for an exorbitant licensing fee is antithetical to this end. It 
is buying and selling patents for the wrong reasons. Similarly, the Florida judicial 
conduct rule at issue in Williams-Yulee, and the approving opinion of Chief Justice 
Roberts, is motivated by the belief that judging aims at an end that is distinctive from 
politics. (Justice Scalia, like many critics of judicial review, seeks to collapse or at least 
reduce the distance between the practices of judging and politics.) The question to 
which this essay has been leading up is, therefore, what is the nature and purpose of 
civil litigation? 
 
 Judges have had something to say about this question when confronted with 
practices such as the assignment of causes of action. Most civil claims, of course, are 
freely alienable, but a narrow category of particularly personal claims are covered by 
anti-assignment rules. Causes of action for professional malpractice, for example, are 
                                                          
68 See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note __; ROBERT SKIDELSKY & EDWARD SKIDELSKY, HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? 
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ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
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13 
 
not assignable in many states. A California court explained the reason for this 
prohibition: 
 
The assignment of such claims could relegate the legal malpractice action to the 
market place and convert it to a commodity to be exploited and transferred to 
economic bidders who have never had a professional relationship with the 
attorney and to whom the attorney has never owed a legal duty, and who have 
never had any prior connection with the assignor or his rights . . .. The almost 
certain end result of merchandizing such causes of action is the lucrative business 
of factoring malpractice claims which would encourage unjustified lawsuits 
against members of the legal profession, generate an increase in legal malpractice 
litigation, promote champerty and force attorneys to defend themselves against 
strangers. The endless complications and litigious intricacies arising out of such 
commercial activities would place an undue burden on not only the legal 
profession but the already overburdened judicial system . . ..70 
 
This passage reveals both instrumental and conceptual analysis of the practice of claim 
assignment. The instrumental argument – common in criticisms of third-party litigation 
financing – is that allowing assignments would encourage unjustified lawsuits and lead 
to complicated and burdensome litigation. It is unexplained why anyone would 
purchase a non-meritorious and therefore valueless lawsuit; that would make no more 
sense than buying a car that does not run or a parcel of Florida swamp land. The point, 
however, is to differentiate that argument formally from the other critique in the 
passage. Assignment of malpractice claims tends to commodify them. Why? Because the 
purchaser is a stranger to the claim – he or she is someone with whom the attorney has 
never had a professional relationship and therefore to whom the attorney has never 
owed a duty.   
 
 The label of trolling signifies buying and selling something for the wrong reasons. 
The discussion of the anti-assignment rule suggests that third parties always have the 
wrong reasons when they involve themselves in lawsuits to which they were strangers ex 
ante. This argument proves too much, however. Only some highly personal claims are 
subject to the anti-assignment rule; most claims are freely alienable. Breach of contract 
and patent infringement claims, for example, are readily assignable. On one view of 
litigation financing, the free alienability of claims allows them to be aggregated and 
pursued more efficiently by claimholders who have broken the expensive monopsony of 
client representation by lawyers pursuant to contingent fee agreements.71 There is 
nevertheless a core claim within anti-trolling rhetoric that has some plausibility; 
interestingly, this claim overlaps with some of the reasons the Court was uncomfortable 
with private funding of judicial campaigns in Williams-Yulee. The core objection to all of 
these practices is that they threaten to erode the public realm.72 A cause of action may 
be alienable, but it is not a purely private good. Society as a whole benefits from the 
resolution of disputes with reference to public values, and the articulation of reasons by 
                                                          
70 Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Ct. App. 1976) (quoted in Sebok, supra note __, 
at 68). 
71 Scales, supra note __, at 950-51.  
72 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).  
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judges that provide public resources for understanding, critiquing, and reforming the 
law. The reason for the discomfort with privately financed judicial election campaigns is 
that, as the Court said, judges are not exactly politicians, in the sense that they do not 
simply and straightforwardly represent the interests of constituents. Rather, they have 
obligations to the law that differ from those of legislators and executive officials. 
Similarly, we criticize patent trolls for abusing a system that is intended at least in part 
to produce the public good of innovative and beneficial new technologies. An actor 
within the civil justice system might likewise be called a litigation troll if its private 
interests predominate over what should be the public end of the system.  
 
 The trouble with this argument, as the dated cite to Owen Fiss’s Against 
Settlement article suggests, is that this ship has long since sailed. Alternative dispute 
resolution advocates largely won the day against Fiss and others who sought to preserve 
litigation as an essentially public good. Courts now routinely order parties to mediate 
claims and, of course, enforce most arbitration clauses in contracts between businesses 
and consumers. As Thomas Coyle’s contribution to this symposium shows, the judicial 
enforcement of anti-aggregation clauses in contracts erects almost insuperable barriers 
to vindicating legal rights where the economic value of an individual party’s claim is 
insufficient to make a lawsuit worthwhile. Whatever public value would be lost by 
enforcing arbitration and anti-aggregation provisions is thought to be compensated by 
speedier, less expensive resolution of disputes. Other practices, such as the widespread 
use of unpublished decisions by appellate courts, have eroded the public’s access to law. 
Society appears to be able to tolerate significant incursions of private processes into the 
litigation system without thereby concluding that its essentially public nature has been 
compromised. Litigation financing is, if anything, a change of much lesser magnitude 
than the widespread use of ADR. The number of cases funded is miniscule in proportion 
to the total number of civil lawsuit filings. More importantly with respect to the 
conceptual argument, litigation financing does not change the underlying relationships 
between the opposing parties and their counsel. Litigation funding agreements prohibit 
funders from exercising control over the conduct of litigation, including the selection of 
counsel, strategic decision-making and, most importantly, the settlement of claims. 
Funders are true strangers to the underlying litigation, and while that distance may 
sometimes prompt an evaluation like Posner’s, it is what actually prevents funders from 
being litigation trolls.  
 
 The “wrong sorts of reasons” critique is much less sweeping than its proponents 
would have us believe. To a significant extent, litigation has been privatized, and 
strangers to the underlying dispute, including liability insurers and plaintiffs’ 
contingency lawyers, are permitted to own a share of one side of the lawsuit and even 
profit from it. It is certainly conceivable that a much narrower, carefully tailored version 
of the critique may have some bite. For example, in comments at the symposium, 
Stephen Gillers suggested that litigation financing must make the plaintiff better off in 
some material respect, and that the client cannot merely be a notional presence or a 
necessarily but inconvenient vehicle for the lawyer and the funder to make a lot of 
money. This test may be vague and unenforceable as a legal standard, but it does 
capture something that seems disquieting to observers of third-party litigation 
financing. In a similar vein, I have insisted that a litigation financing relationship not 
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interfere unduly with the independent professional judgment of the lawyer representing 
the plaintiff.73 Lawyers sometimes play the valuable role of introducing beneficial 
inefficiencies into a market – functioning as grit, rather than grease.74 If they 
understand their clients’ claims only from a financial point of view, as assets with value 
that can be carved up and alienated in various ways, lawyers are missing an essential 
aspect of their ethical obligations. But the response to this risk should not be to 
introduce overbroad and heavy-handed regulation. There are all sorts of risks to 
lawyers’ independent professional judgment. Hourly and contingent fees both 
potentially misalign the interests of lawyers and clients,75 and yet the regulation of 
attorneys’ fees is remarkably deferential to the profession.76 Similarly, lawyers’ advice to 
clients concerning settlement is rife with agency problems,77 yet there is virtually no 
regulation of this area of professional practice, save for a few malpractice cases arising 
out of grossly incompetent advice.78 The reason is that we still have some faith in 
lawyers’ respect for their ethical obligations. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to 
use the term “ethical dilemma” to refer to a settlement offer conditioned upon an 
agreement by the plaintiff’s lawyer to waive a statutory entitlement to seek attorney’s 
fees: 
 
[A] lawyer is under an ethical obligation to exercise independent professional 
judgment on behalf of his client; he must not allow his own interests, financial or 
otherwise, to influence his professional advice. Accordingly, it is argued that a 
lawyer is required to evaluate a settlement offer on the basis of his client’s 
interest, without considering his own interest in obtaining a fee; upon 
recommending settlement, he must abide by the client’s decision whether or not 
to accept the offer. 79 
 
As long as this trust is not misplaced, there is no reason to overreact to the perceived 




 All litigation is financed; the only question is how, and by whom. Innumerable 
lawsuits involve funding by liability insurers and plaintiffs’ counsel, who have their own 
interests for investing their capital in litigation. As a matter of professional ethics, 
lawyers are simply expected to deal with the crosscutting personal, financial, and 
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professional incentives that affect the representation of clients. There is accordingly a 
high burden of persuasion on the claim that third-party financing is conceptually 
different from practices with which we have long since made peace. This is not to deny 
the risk. The analogies reviewed here, of patent trolling and the thin line between judges 
and politicians, are meant to show that it can be important to attend to the reasons for 
which an actor engages in a practice. From where I sit, as a legal ethics scholar and an 
occasional advisor to funders and law firms, the existing structure of regulation – of 
both lawyers and the funding contract itself – appears to be more than adequate to 
mitigate these risks.80 If the risks can be managed, there is no more justification in 
calling third-party funders “trolls” than in prohibiting life insurance because it involves 
speculation on death. Some practices seem a bit strange when first introduced, but 
eventually become normalized. As litigation financing becomes more familiar, the focus 
of discussion should shift from whether it should exist at all to whether risks to clients 
or lawyers remain, and how those risks should best be addressed.  
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